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Abstract
Research Summary: Extant research suggests that firms
rationally evaluate external and/or internal contingencies
when deciding how to reconfigure their alliance portfolios.
We advance a behavioral perspective which assumes that
managers are boundedly rational and thus rely on behav-
ioral heuristics when making alliance portfolio
reconfiguration decisions. In panel data on U.S.-listed bio-
technology firms, we find that below-aspiration perfor-
mance motivates a firm to form alliances with novel
partners within the resource scope of its existing alliance
portfolio. This effect is weakened by equity ties with exis-
ting partners and strengthened by firm-specific uncer-
tainty. Conversely, above-aspiration performance leads to
new alliances with existing partners but outside the
resource scope of the firm's existing alliance portfolio.
Finally, as organizational slack increases, a firm forms
alliances with novel partners focusing on new-to-the-
portfolio resources.
Managerial Summary: We study why and how firms
change the configuration of their alliance portfolios over
time. We find that actual performance relative to perfor-
mance objectives, and firms' excess resources, are important
drivers of such change. The more firms fail to meet their
performance objectives, the more likely they are to form
alliances with novel partners focusing on areas in which
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they already have one or more alliances with other partners.
The more firms exceed their performance objectives, the
greater their inclination to form alliances with their existing
partners in areas in which they do not yet have alliances.
The greater the stock of excess resources, the greater firms'
propensities to form alliances with novel partners focusing
on areas in which they do not yet have alliances.
KEYWORD S
alliance portfolios, innovation performance, organizational slack,
performance aspirations, pharmaceutical biotechnology
1 | INTRODUCTION
The portfolio perspective on interfirm alliances suggests that the benefits firms derive from their alli-
ance portfolios can exceed the sum of the benefits obtained from each individual alliance (Hoehn-
Weiss, Karim, & Lee, 2017; Wassmer, 2010). Building on this insight, numerous studies have sought
to identify alliance portfolio configurations that enhance firm performance (e.g., Bos, Faems, &
Noseleit, 2017; Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Jiang, Tao, & Santoro, 2010; Lavie, 2007; Ozcan &
Eisenhardt, 2009; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012; Wassmer, Li, & Madhok, 2017) and related out-
comes such as liquidity events (Hoehn-Weiss & Karim, 2014), knowledge acquisition (Frankort,
Hagedoorn, & Letterie, 2012), and product innovation (Wuyts & Dutta, 2014). While these studies
contribute to understanding the consequences of portfolio configurations, little research has examined
why firms decide to change the configuration of, or “reconfigure,” their alliance portfolios over time,
and how they implement such decisions.
Besides conceptual suggestions (e.g., Kim, Oh, & Swaminathan, 2006; Koka, Madhavan, & Pres-
cott, 2006), empirical studies show that alliance portfolio reconfiguration may be driven by firm-
specific uncertainty (Beckman, Haunschild, & Phillips, 2004), gradual shifts in a firm's strategy in
response to external technological changes (Lavie & Singh, 2012), combinations of strategic uncer-
tainty and firm competencies (Hoffmann, 2007), and external contingencies such as technological
discontinuities (Asgari, Singh, & Mitchell, 2017) or market competition and uncertainty (Beckman
et al., 2004; Ozcan, 2018). While providing valuable insights into the antecedents of alliance portfo-
lio reconfigurations, these studies conceptualize managers as value-maximizing decision makers who
make portfolio reconfiguration decisions based on a rational evaluation of external and/or internal
contingencies. Yet, managers are more accurately viewed as boundedly rational (Simon, 1955) and
so they may rely on behavioral heuristics when making decisions regarding alliance portfolio
reconfiguration. Despite broader evidence that behavioral drivers such as performance feedback and
a stock of slack resources (Cyert & March, 1963) influence firms' collaborative activities (Baum,
Rowley, Shipilov, & Chuang, 2005; Ener & Hoang, 2016; Lungeanu, Stern, & Zajac, 2016;
Makarevich, 2018; Tyler & Caner, 2016), we know little about how such factors may affect firms'
alliance portfolio reconfigurations.
In this study, we develop a comprehensive model of alliance portfolio reconfiguration based on
the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), a theory of decision making rooted in the
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notion that managers are boundedly rational. Our central line of argument consists of four parts:
(a) Performance feedback and slack resources influence firms' preferences regarding value creation
and appropriation from their alliance portfolios (Lavie, 2007); (b) portfolio-level value creation and
appropriation derive from synergies and conflicts in the alliance portfolio (Hoehn-Weiss et al.,
2017); (c) these synergies and conflicts are determined by portfolios' partner and resource character-
istics (Gulati, Lavie, & Madhavan, 2011); and thus (d) firms accommodate their evolving value
creation and appropriation preferences by reconfiguring their portfolios through simultaneous
partner-choice and resource-focus decisions in newly formed alliances.
We propose that below-aspiration performance will motivate a firm to seek greater value appro-
priation from its alliance portfolio to address performance problems (Cyert & March, 1963). To this
end, the firm will reconfigure its portfolio by forming alliances with novel partners, yet focusing on
resources already accessible through its alliance portfolio, which may induce competition between
new and existing partners, increasing the firm's bargaining power (Lavie, 2007). In contrast, above-
aspiration performance and slack resources motivate a firm to seek greater value creation from its
alliance portfolio (Chen & Miller, 2007). Therefore, the firm will reconfigure the portfolio by for-
ming alliances focusing on new resources, thus expanding the scope for synergistic resource combi-
nations (Gulati et al., 2011; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). While above-aspiration performance
motivates firms to form such alliances with existing partners due to the implied satisfaction with
these partners (Levinthal & March, 1993), slack motivates and enables simultaneous experimentation
with new resources and novel partners (Greve, 2003a). We also uncover some boundary conditions
by examining how firms' equity ties to existing partners and firm-specific uncertainty alter the role of
performance feedback and slack resources in motivating specific types of alliance portfolio
reconfiguration. Empirical analyses of U.S.-listed biotechnology firms from 1981 to 2000 generally
support our predictions.
Our first and primary contribution lies in developing and testing a behavioral theory of alliance
portfolio reconfiguration. By conceptualizing managers as boundedly rational decision makers, we
show evidence that they are guided by behavioral heuristics, thus providing novel insights into the
antecedents of observed alliance portfolio configurations. Second, while the behavioral theory has
long argued that firms may respond differently to below-aspiration performance, above-aspiration
performance, or organizational slack, empirical evidence of such differences is sparse (Posen, Keil,
Kim, & Meissner, 2018). By uncovering how the nature of firms' responses to these distinct behav-
ioral drivers differs, we extend the behavioral literature with more fine-grained and discerning evi-
dence of behaviorally motivated organizational decisions. Finally, behavioral research has
traditionally focused on the relationships between behavioral drivers and organizational decisions,
with limited attention to the boundary conditions of such relationships (Greve & Gaba, 2017; Shin-
kle, 2012). In the context of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, we extend this nascent understanding
of boundary conditions by elucidating how a firm's equity ties and firm-specific uncertainty interact
with behavioral mechanisms.
2 | THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
The core premise of the portfolio perspective on alliances is that, in addition to value obtained from
individual alliances, firms can also derive value from their alliance portfolios by combining resources
accessed through multiple simultaneous alliances (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Lavie, 2007;
Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). A critical determinant of such additional value is the prevalence of
portfolio interdependencies, that is, the synergies and conflicts in the portfolio which result from “the
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complex patterns of resource exchanges or flows between a focal firm and one alliance partner as
well as the resource flows between a focal firm and other partners within its alliance portfolio”
(Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017, p. 57). Portfolio interdependencies determine a focal firm's value creation
and appropriation from its alliance portfolio (Lavie, 2007). Specifically, a firm may create value by
exploiting synergies arising from combinations of portfolio resources, meaning alliance partners' tan-
gible and intangible assets and capabilities, such as specialized equipment, expertise in a specific
area, or technological know-how, whose services are made available to the firm through collabora-
tion (Gulati et al., 2011).1 Moreover, the firm can appropriate value from its alliance portfolio by
exploiting conflicts among its partners (Lavie, 2007).
As a firm's preferences change regarding value creation and appropriation from its alliance portfo-
lio, a motivation will arise to alter portfolio interdependencies in a way that accommodates these
evolving preferences. A firm can accomplish this by reconfiguring portfolio characteristics that give
rise to potential portfolio interdependencies. We begin by discussing such characteristics. Subse-
quently, we identify three distinct portfolio-reconfiguration options that can change portfolio interde-
pendencies, with different implications for value creation and appropriation from a firm's portfolio.
Finally, we develop predictions regarding how performance feedback and a stock of slack resources
influence a firm's alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions, by affecting its preferences regarding
value creation and appropriation.
2.1 | Alliance portfolio characteristics and interdependencies
Alliance portfolio research suggests three determinants of synergies and conflicts in an alliance port-
folio. First, the resource richness of an alliance portfolio—the breadth of portfolio resources available
to a firm through its alliances—determines the scope for portfolio synergies (Gulati et al., 2011). As
the breadth of portfolio resources increases, so does the scope for their synergistic combinations,
implying greater value creation potential available to the firm (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Lavie,
2007; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). Second, a firm's receptivity to portfolio resources—how effec-
tively a firm can leverage these resources (Gulati et al., 2011)—determines the extent to which the
firm can realize potential synergies in the portfolio. A key determinant of receptivity is the quality of
a firm's ties to its alliance partners (Gulati et al., 2011), which in turn depends on relational assets,
such as shared collaborative routines (Zollo, Reuer, & Singh, 2002) and trust (Gulati, Lavie, &
Singh, 2009). Although relational assets are dyadic in nature (Gulati et al., 2009; Zollo et al., 2002),
they can also enhance portfolio-level value creation because more effective access to partner
resources in individual alliances enhances a firm's ability to combine such resources with other port-
folio resources.
Third, the availability to a firm of alternative partners providing access to similar resources deter-
mines the degree of potential conflicts within a portfolio and, thus, the firm's relative bargaining
power vis-à-vis its partners (Lavie, 2007), that is, its ability to favorably shape the terms of resource
exchanges with its partners (Yan & Gray, 1994). A firm's bargaining power is limited to the extent
that it depends on specific partners to access a given resource. Multiple alliance partners enabling
access to similar resources may induce conflicts in an alliance portfolio in the form of competition
among a firm's partners. Such competition enables the firm to negotiate more favorable resource
exchange conditions with its partners, enhancing its ability to appropriate value created through the
portfolio (Lavie, 2007).
1“Portfolio resources” correspond to what Gulati et al. (2011) call “network resources.”
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This line of reasoning suggests that the richness of portfolio resources, the receptivity of a firm to
these resources, and the availability of alternative partners jointly can affect portfolio synergies and
conflicts. Therefore, reconfiguring these portfolio characteristics is likely to change such interdepen-
dencies, which may in turn change the extent to which the firm can create and appropriate value from
its alliance portfolio. Below, we identify and discuss the benefits, costs, and risks of particular
portfolio-reconfiguration options in light of their potential impact on portfolio synergies and
conflicts.
2.2 | Alliance portfolio reconfiguration
In this study, alliance portfolio reconfiguration refers to the addition of one or more alliances that
introduce novel partners and/or new resources to a firm's alliance portfolio in a way that changes the
portfolio's resource richness, the firm's receptivity, and/or the availability of alternative partners. A
portfolio's resource richness increases when the firm adds to its portfolio an alliance focusing on new
resources—that is, resources not currently accessible through the portfolio—which extends the scope
for synergistic combinations of portfolio resources (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Wassmer & Dussauge,
2012). A firm's receptivity depends on the extent to which the firm shares relational assets with its
partners. Since such assets are developed over the course of repeated collaborations (Gulati, 1995;
Zollo et al., 2002), alliances with novel partners—with which the focal firm does not currently have
an alliance—may reduce the firm's effectiveness in combining portfolio resources. However, novel
partners may also introduce the firm to innovative ways of combining portfolio resources (Hoang &
Rothaermel, 2005), which may enhance value creation from its alliance portfolio.
The availability of alternative partners increases when a firm adds to its portfolio an alliance with
a novel partner focusing on resources already accessible through the portfolio (Lavie, 2007). The
presence of multiple alliances in a portfolio that provide access to similar resources induces competi-
tion between new and existing partners for preferential access to the firm's resources and attention,
increasing the firm's bargaining power and enabling it to appropriate a greater share of the value cre-
ated in the portfolio (Lavie, 2007; Sailer, 1978). However, such an act may also lead to unfavorable
outcomes for the focal firm. Specifically, existing partners may perceive the firm's new alliances as
cannibalizing the value of their alliances with the firm (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017), for example due
to possible leakage of their proprietary knowledge to the firm's novel partners. Such perceptions may
prompt existing partners to take defensive actions and sever their resource exchanges with the
focal firm.
We propose that a firm can reconfigure its alliance portfolio in three ways. Table 1 summarizes
our typology of alliance portfolio-reconfiguration options based on partner-choice and resource-focus
decisions in a firm's new alliances. First, the firm may form alliances with novel partners focusing on
existing resources, that is, resources already accessible through its alliance portfolio. Such alliances
may enhance the firm's value appropriation from the portfolio and introduce the firm to innovative
ways of combining portfolio resources (Lavie, 2007). At the same time, they can reduce the firm's
receptivity due to the lack of relational assets shared with novel partners. Furthermore, this
reconfiguration option may trigger defensive actions from existing partners, which will lower the
firm's ability to create value from the portfolio (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017). Thus, the firm will invoke
this portfolio-reconfiguration option to the extent that it anticipates the potential increase in value
appropriation to outweigh such costs and risks.
Second, the firm may form alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources. Leaving
the firm's value appropriation ability unchanged, this reconfiguration option enables the firm to
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extend the resource richness of its alliance portfolio, which increases the portfolio's value creation
potential (Gulati et al., 2011; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012). This option also allows the firm to
exploit the relational assets shared with existing partners, which enhances its receptivity. Notwith-
standing these potential benefits, this reconfiguration option may preclude the firm from adopting
innovative ways of combining portfolio resources that may be accessible through novel partners,
preventing it from realizing the full value creation potential of its portfolio resources. Thus, a firm
will be inclined to invoke this portfolio-reconfiguration option to the extent that it is satisfied with
the share of the value that it appropriates from its alliance portfolio, and with the outcomes of
resource exchanges with its partners.
Third, the firm may form alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. This
reconfiguration option enables the firm to simultaneously extend its portfolio's resource richness and
experiment with innovative ways of combining resources accessed through novel partners. However,
the lack of relational assets shared with novel partners may reduce the effectiveness of such experi-
mentation and curb value creation from the portfolio. Moreover, although these alliances pose no
direct competition to resource exchanges between the firm and its existing partners, the latter may
still engage in defensive actions because the inclusion of novel partners in an alliance portfolio is
likely to restrict the resources and attention extended by a firm to its existing partners (Singh &
Mitchell, 1996). Thus, a firm will be motivated to invoke this portfolio-reconfiguration option to the
extent that it can tolerate a reduction in collaboration effectiveness as well as the risk of severed
resource exchanges with its existing partners.
TABLE 1 Three types of alliance portfolio reconfiguration through alliance formation
Resource focus Partner choice Potential benefits Costs Risks
1 Existing resources Novel partners Greater bargaining
power through
competition
between new and
existing partners;
and access to
innovative ways of
combining
portfolio resources
Reduced receptivity
due to lack of
relational assets
shared with novel
partners
Suboptimal value creation
from portfolio due to
severed resource
exchanges with existing
partners
2 New resources Existing partners Greater resource
richness; and
enhanced
receptivity due to
exploitation of
existing relational
assets
Inability to access
innovative ways of
combining new
resources with
other portfolio
resources
Suboptimal value creation
from portfolio due to
exclusive reliance on
existing partners to
leverage new resources
3 New resources Novel partners Greater resource
richness; and
access to
innovative ways of
combining
portfolio resources
Reduced receptivity
due to lack of
relational assets
shared with novel
partners
Suboptimal value creation
from portfolio due to
simultaneous exposure to
severed resource
exchanges with existing
partners and reduced
receptivity
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To illustrate these three portfolio-reconfiguration options, we provide for each type of alliance
formation an example from the pharmaceutical biotechnology industry, our empirical context. The
process of developing genetically engineered drugs, which involves identifying potential drug candi-
dates, developing them to have the desired properties, and undertaking clinical trials, requires combi-
nations of resources that even the largest firms do not possess in-house. Therefore, alliance portfolios
have been a vital means for firms in this industry to access resources (Baum, Calabrese, &
Silverman, 2000; Pisano, 2006). Table 2 provides illustrative examples of alliance formations by
Genentech, the first public biotechnology firm, which pioneered the industry by developing the first
genetically engineered human therapeutic.
As Genentech's alliances illustrate, firms can also add to their portfolios alliances with existing
partners focusing on existing resources, in addition to the three reconfiguration options that we dis-
cussed. Such alliances enable a firm to deepen its focus on resource combinations already available
in its alliance portfolio. For example, firms may continue the development of promising projects or
apply the same resources towards developing products with different commercial purposes. How-
ever, since such alliances do not introduce novel partners and/or new resources to a firm's alliance
portfolio, in our study they do not imply a portfolio reconfiguration.
Overall, in addition to the costs of forming and managing alliances that are associated with alli-
ance portfolio reconfiguration in general (Asgari et al., 2017), each of these reconfiguration options
TABLE 2 Examples of Genentech's alliances with different combinations of partner choice and resource focus
Existing resources New resources
Existing partners Genentech formed an alliance with Stemcells
Inc. in 1996 to advance development
efforts for specific drug candidates
identified as promising through a previous
collaboration with the same partner in
1994, which focused on a variety of
candidates. In both alliances, the key
resource introduced to Genentech's alliance
portfolio was Stemcells' expertise in the
oral delivery of central nervous system
drugs
After collaborating with Incyte Inc. to
develop and commercialize a human
protein called BPI, Genentech formed an
alliance with the same partner in 1997 to
access Incyte's database on gene
sequencing, a valuable resource to aid the
interpretation of genetic code stored in
DNA through gene expression
technology
Novel partners In 1987, Genentech formed an alliance with
Genzyme Inc. focusing on recombinant
DNA, which enables DNA from different
sources to be combined to create new DNA
forms that are useful to treat diseases but
do not exist naturally. Between its
inception in 1976 and this alliance,
Genentech formed 11 other alliances with
different partners to access technological
expertise in recombinant DNA technology,
a key resource to develop genetically
engineered drugs
In 1989, Genentech formed an alliance with
Xenova Inc. for the screening of
biologically active small molecules to
identify promising drug candidates for
further development. The partners did not
have a prior collaboration and the
alliance introduced Xenova's proprietary
screening technology to Genentech's
alliance portfolio. This technology added
a critical and new resource to the
portfolio since the value of other drug
development resources would increase,
as new and promising drug candidates
can more easily be identified using this
new resource
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implies a unique combination of potential benefits, costs, and risks. Firms reconfigure their alliance
portfolios to the extent they anticipate that the benefits of reconfiguration outweigh the costs and
risks (Wassmer, 2010). Although available research provides valuable insights into the antecedents
of alliance portfolio reconfigurations, it has tended to conceptualize managers as value-maximizing
decision-makers who rationally evaluate external and/or internal contingencies when making portfo-
lio reconfiguration decisions. Yet, managers are more accurately viewed as boundedly rational
(Simon, 1955), which implies they may rely on behavioral heuristics when making decisions regard-
ing alliance portfolio reconfiguration. Thus, we next draw on the behavioral theory of the firm
(Cyert & March, 1963) and develop and test predictions regarding how boundedly rational managers
make alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions based on an evaluation of the benefits, costs, and
risks of different reconfiguration options.
3 | HYPOTHESES
A key premise of the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) is that the extent and
nature of organizational search and risk-taking is influenced by a firm's actual performance relative
to performance aspirations (Greve, 2003b), and its stock of slack resources (Greve, 2003a; Nohria &
Gulati, 1996). Performance aspirations serve as reference points that help distinguish perceived fail-
ures and successes, and typically evolve over time as functions of a firm's own historical performance
and the performance of comparable others (Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Levinthal & March, 1981). An
attainment discrepancy occurs when performance deviates from aspirations, and may serve as an
inducement for organizational search and risk-taking.
Negative attainment discrepancies trigger “problemistic search,” a goal-oriented behavior focused
on raising performance to the firm's aspiration level (Cyert & March, 1963; Levinthal & March,
1981). A firm's stock of slack resources, that is, resources in excess of those necessary for the firm's
daily operations, prompts “slack search,” which enables the firm to undertake more substantial orga-
nizational changes and experiment with risky but potentially rewarding projects (Cyert & March,
1963; Greve, 2003a; Levinthal & March, 1981). Finally, positive attainment discrepancies, while not
necessarily generating slack resources, may motivate experimentation with new projects by reducing
the cost of accessing new resources, thus mitigating fears of poor performance and motivating firms
to loosen managerial controls (Baum et al., 2005). Based on these insights, we develop predictions
connecting performance relative to aspirations and slack resources to the three alliance portfolio-
reconfiguration options that we identified above.
3.1 | Below-aspiration performance
When performance is below aspirations, firms engage in problemistic search, which typically implies
a search for relatively immediate improvements to reduce or eliminate negative attainment discrepan-
cies (Levinthal & March, 1981). Thus, problemistic search tends to be myopic, in that it constitutes
efforts to find solutions near the problem symptom or the current activities (Cyert & March, 1963).
Because alliance portfolios are important for firm performance (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017; Lavie,
2007; Wassmer & Dussauge, 2012), firms performing below their aspirations will initiate actions to
obtain greater benefits from their portfolios to address performance shortfalls. Due to its relatively
short-term and myopic nature, problemistic search is unlikely to involve exploration of new resource
combinations because such exploration typically requires considerable time before contributing to a
firm's performance (March, 1991). Thus, speedier performance improvements are more likely
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realized through an increased commitment to existing resources. We therefore propose that a nega-
tive attainment discrepancy motivates firms to search for ways to appropriate more value from exis-
ting portfolio resources.
Firms can more effectively leverage and appropriate value from existing portfolio resources by
forming alliances with novel partners, yet replicating the resource focus of existing alliances. Such
alliances may offer fresh perspectives on how to use existing portfolio resources more effectively.
Moreover, a firm's potential access to innovative ways of utilizing its existing portfolio resources
through novel partners is likely to induce competition between the firm's existing and novel partners,
enabling the firm to increase its bargaining power vis-à-vis these partners, and appropriate a greater
share of the value created through the portfolio (Lavie, 2007). Although this portfolio-reconfiguration
option carries the risk of defensive actions from existing partners, a negative attainment discrepancy
will motivate firms to tolerate such risks in an effort to meet performance aspirations (Bromiley &
Harris, 2014; Greve, 2003a, 2003b).
Hypothesis 1. The lower a firm's performance relative to aspirations, the greater the firm's number
of new alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources.
3.2 | Above-aspiration performance
Firm performance exceeding aspirations leads to loosening managerial controls and motivates experi-
mentation with new projects with high potential pay-offs (Baum et al., 2005; Chen & Miller, 2007).
Moreover, above-aspiration performance reduces the cost of accessing new resources (Baum et al.,
2005), for example by enhancing the attractiveness of a firm to investors. Consequently, firms per-
forming above aspirations will be inclined to explore new value creation opportunities. A viable way
in which a firm can achieve this is to extend the scope for synergistic combinations of resources
accessed through its alliance portfolio by enhancing the portfolio's resource richness. While such
exploration is inherently uncertain and risky (March, 1991), above-aspiration performance motivates
firms to tolerate these uncertainties and risks by acting as a buffer between actual performance and
aspirations (Baum et al., 2005).
For two reasons, we suggest that firms performing above their aspirations will be motivated to
include new resources in their alliance portfolios through alliances with existing rather than novel
partners. First, allying with existing partners enables firms to exploit relational assets shared with
these partners, which in turn enhances the effectiveness of combining portfolio resources accessed
through new and existing alliances. Second, above-aspiration performance acts as an implicit valida-
tion of the firm's choice of alliance partners, and induces satisfaction with the value appropriated
from the alliance portfolio (Levinthal & March, 1993). Although allying with novel partners may
enable a firm to appropriate greater value from its alliance portfolio, or to adopt new ways of com-
bining portfolio resources, for firms performing above aspirations the risk of jeopardizing their rela-
tionships with existing partners likely outweighs the potential benefits offered by novel partners
(Singh & Mitchell, 1996).
Hypothesis 2. The higher a firm's performance relative to aspirations, the greater the firm's number
of new alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources.
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3.3 | Organizational slack
Our arguments so far imply that when reconfiguring their alliance portfolios in response to perfor-
mance feedback, firms limit their risk-taking to either the partner-choice or resource-focus decisions.
Thus, they avoid excessive risks associated with the formation of alliances with novel partners focus-
ing on new resources (Lavie, Kang, & Rosenkopf, 2011). Yet, when do firms opt for this third
reconfiguration option?
The behavioral theory of the firm offers organizational slack as one source enabling firms to
experiment with risky but potentially rewarding organizational changes (Cyert & March, 1963;
Greve, 2003a). Absorbed slack, a particular form of organizational slack, refers to organizational
capacity above and beyond what is required for a firm's day-to-day operations, such as excess facili-
ties and personnel for research and development (R&D) (Greve, 2003a). The deployment of
absorbed slack does not directly affect a firm's core operations and so enables relatively more risky
explorations of new value creation opportunities (Levinthal & March, 1981; Nohria & Gulati, 1996).
While above-aspiration performance also allows firms to experiment with risky projects (e.g., Baum
et al., 2005), positive attainment discrepancies are potentially short-lived due to the adaptive nature
of performance aspirations. Instead, absorbed slack accumulates and is dispersed over longer periods
of time, providing a more permanent buffer between the outcomes of risky actions and their conse-
quences for short-term performance (Greve, 2003a).
We argue that absorbed slack motivates and enables firms to reconfigure their alliance portfolios
by forming alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. This may introduce a firm to
superior ways to combine the new resources with existing portfolio resources. Yet, such alliances
may restrict the firm's value creation from the portfolio if existing partners sever their resource
exchanges with the firm due to the perceived shift of the firm's managerial resources and attention to
its novel partners (Singh & Mitchell, 1996). Moreover, alliances with novel partners reduce the firm's
receptivity, leading to less effective value creation at the portfolio level. Absorbed slack mitigates the
impact of a decline in value creation from the alliance portfolio by acting as a buffer between the out-
comes of organizational actions and their short-term performance consequences. Thus, slack miti-
gates a firm's vulnerability to defensive actions from its partners as well as reduced receptivity, and
provides firms the motivation and ability to experiment with novel partners and new resources.
Hypothesis 3. The higher a firm's level of absorbed slack, the greater the firm's number of new alli-
ances with novel partners focusing on new resources.
3.4 | The moderating role of equity ties to existing partners
When examining firms' alliance portfolio reconfigurations, one important contingency is a firm's
equity ties to its existing alliance partners. Equity ties include joint ventures in which partners share
equity in a newly created entity, and minority equity investments in which one or both partners make
an investment in the other in exchange for equity (Gulati & Singh, 1998). In contrast to purely con-
tractual alliances, equity ties require alliance partners to make ex-ante investments, which increase
their commitment to each other (Gulati & Singh, 1998). First, an investment by a partner in a focal
firm's equity provides the partner some control over the firm's activities, deterring the firm from
engaging in actions that might undermine the alliance and the partner's investment (Oxley, 1997).
Second, an investment by a focal firm in a partner's equity is unlikely to be recovered unless the alli-
ance achieves its intended objectives. Thus, to protect its own investment, the firm will be committed
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to maintaining its resource exchanges with the partner towards the realization of alliance goals, and
refrain from actions that might jeopardize these exchanges. Finally, reciprocal equity investments,
including joint ventures, create a “mutual hostage” situation in which both partners have incentives
not to jeopardize their relationship because doing so would put their ex-ante investments at risk
(Oxley, 1997; Pisano, 1989).
We argue that, by increasing commitments to their existing partners, equity ties influence firms'
alliance portfolio-reconfiguration decisions in response to performance feedback and slack resources.
First, in H1 we predicted that below-aspiration performance motivates firms to reconfigure their alli-
ance portfolios by forming alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources. We expect
equity ties to curb this tendency by amplifying the perceived costs and risks relative to the potential
benefits associated with this portfolio-reconfiguration option. A firm's new alliances with novel part-
ners focusing on existing resources may be perceived as a form of opportunistic behavior by existing
partners that have invested in the firm (Hoehn-Weiss et al., 2017), prompting them to invoke their
equity rights to protect their investments in the firm. The risk of retaliation is lower when investing
partners do not perceive such alliances as an attempt to behave opportunistically, or when they have
a limited ability to retaliate. However, the shift of a firm's attention regarding existing resources from
existing to novel partners may signal inconsistency with the commitment expectations implied by
equity ties, and harm the firm's reputation as a desirable alliance partner (Dacin, Oliver, &
Roy, 2007).
When equity ties are instead formed by a focal firm's investments in its partners, this portfolio-
reconfiguration option is tantamount to suggesting that such investments failed to generate the
expected returns. Although ex-ante investments in partners' equity are sunk costs for a focal firm,
managers tend to avoid acknowledging losses so as not to appear incompetent (Staw, 1981). Thus,
firms are likely to maintain a commitment to these investments (Inkpen & Ross, 2001), and refrain
from actions implying a decline in their value. In case of reciprocal investments, the desire to avoid
retaliation, reputation loss, and an implied loss in value of existing equity investments jointly deter
firms from invoking this portfolio-reconfiguration option.
This line of reasoning also extends to our hypothesized effect of absorbed slack on firms' tenden-
cies to reconfigure their alliances portfolios by forming alliances with novel partners focusing on
new resources (H3). Although absorbed slack enables firms to tolerate the costs and risks of simulta-
neous exploration with novel partners and new resources, equity ties to existing partners likely curtail
this tendency. While absorbed slack shields a firm's regular operations from the short-term decline of
value created from its alliance portfolio, the possible negative performance consequences of partner
retaliation, reputation loss, and/or an implied loss in the value of existing equity investments amplify
perceived costs and risks associated with this portfolio-reconfiguration option. Thus, equity ties
reduce the impact of absorbed slack on alliance portfolio reconfiguration through alliances with
novel partners focusing on new resources.
Finally, for firms performing above aspirations, we expect equity ties to reinforce the tendency to
reconfigure alliance portfolios by forming alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources
(H2). Above-aspiration performance motivates firms to seek greater value creation from their alliance
portfolios through exploration of new resource combinations, and implies a commitment to existing
partners by acting as an implicit validation of the firm's choice of alliance partners. By imposing
additional commitments to existing partners, equity ties heighten the opportunity cost of allying with
novel, rather than existing, partners to experiment with new resources, thus increasing the attractive-
ness of this portfolio-reconfiguration option in response to positive attainment discrepancies.
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Hypothesis 4a. As a firm's equity commitment to existing partners increases, a decrease in perfor-
mance relative to aspirations is less strongly associated with a firm's number of new alliances with
novel partners focusing on existing resources.
Hypothesis 4b. As a firm's equity commitment to existing partners increases, an increase in perfor-
mance relative to aspirations is more strongly associated with a firm's number of new alliances with
existing partners focusing on new resources.
Hypothesis 4c. As a firm's equity commitment to existing partners increases, an increase in
absorbed slack is less strongly associated with a firm's number of new alliances with novel partners
focusing on new resources.
3.5 | The moderating role of firm-specific uncertainty
Another factor that influences firms' alliance portfolio reconfiguration is the degree of firm-specific
uncertainty (Beckman et al., 2004; Howard, Withers, Carnes, & Hillman, 2016), which refers to ambigu-
ity stemming from idiosyncratic sources regarding the expected outcomes of organizational actions
(Gulati et al., 2009). In order to manage and reduce firm-specific uncertainty, firms search for new infor-
mation, which can often be accessed through novel alliance partners (Beckman et al., 2004). We extend
these insights to develop predictions regarding how firm-specific uncertainty affects firms' alliance
portfolio-reconfiguration decisions, by intensifying problemistic search and attenuating slack search.
Problemistic search compels firms performing below aspirations to seek targeted solutions to gener-
ate greater performance from their current activities (Greve, 2003a). Reconfiguration of alliance portfo-
lios through the formation of alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources can be such a
solution (H1). We argue that firm-specific uncertainty will strengthen the tendency to invoke this
portfolio-reconfiguration option as a response to below-aspiration performance. Uncertainty compounds
the need for new information regarding the causes that prevent firms' existing portfolio resources from
contributing to a satisfactory level of performance. Firm-specific uncertainty also implies a lowered abil-
ity to assess the likelihood that new and useful information will become available through particular
novel alliance partners. Increasing the number of alliances with novel partners focusing on existing
resources will enable firms to diversify their attempts to access new information to address performance
problems, and increase the probability that such information will become available.
In contrast to problemistic search, slack search enables firms to undertake risky but potentially
rewarding projects that are more distant from their current activities, such as experimenting with new
resources. Absorbed slack, and to a lesser extent above-aspiration performance, allows firms to
afford such risk-taking by acting as a buffer between the potential adverse outcomes of risky deci-
sions and firms' core activities. While experimentation with new resources inherently implies uncer-
tain pay-offs, firm-specific uncertainty compounds the difficulty of evaluating the expected
outcomes of such experimentation. As a result, whether the anticipated benefits of portfolio configu-
ration options involving a focus on new resources will outweigh their costs and risks becomes more
ambiguous. This, in turn, may lead to concerns regarding the extent to which past performance
exceeding aspirations and absorbed slack may shield firms' regular operations from the potentially
adverse effects of risky portfolio-reconfiguration decisions. Therefore, we expect firm-specific uncer-
tainty to deter firms from engaging in alliance portfolio reconfiguration through alliances focusing
on new resources with existing or novel partners as a response to above-aspiration performance and
absorbed slack.
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Hypothesis 5a. As firm-specific uncertainty increases, a decrease in performance relative to aspira-
tions is more strongly associated with a firm's number of new alliances with novel partners focusing
on existing resources.
Hypothesis 5b. As firm-specific uncertainty increases, an increase in performance relative to aspi-
rations is less strongly associated with a firm's number of new alliances with existing partners focus-
ing on new resources.
Hypothesis 5c. As firm-specific uncertainty increases, an increase in absorbed slack is less strongly
associated with a firm's number of new alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources.
4 | METHODS
4.1 | Empirical setting
We tested our hypotheses in an empirical study of U.S.-listed dedicated biotechnology firms (DBFs)
engaged in alliances during 1985–2000. Although many large pharmaceutical firms and some food
and agricultural firms have been involved in biotechnology since its emergence in the 1970s, the cen-
tral players in this industry are DBFs (Pisano, 2006; Powell, 1996). DBFs are ideal subjects for our
study. To share the costs and reduce the risks of drug development, DBFs actively engage in alli-
ances with each other and with other players, such as large pharmaceutical firms (Pisano, 2006).
Such alliances play an important role in the innovation performance of DBFs (Baum et al., 2000)
and evidence implies that DBFs care deeply about the value creation and appropriation potential of
their alliance portfolios (e.g., Asgari et al., 2017). Moreover, a focus on DBFs gives us a relatively
homogeneous set of firms, which ensures comparability in the firms' line of business and normal
resource requirements, an important condition for isolating performance feedback and slack resource
effects (Greve, 2003a, 2003b).
4.2 | Data and sample
Following Gulati and Higgins (2003) and Higgins and Gulati (2006), we obtained our initial sample
of 280 public DBFs from the BioWorld Stock Report for Public Biotechnology Companies in 2001.
This listing excludes large corporations with primary activities outside of biotechnology, thus consti-
tuting an appropriate data source for our study. In this initial sample, we were able to match 231 firms
to identifiers in both Compustat and the NBER Patent Data Project (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg,
2002). We then identified all alliances formed by these 231 firms from 1985 to 2000 using the
Recombinant Capital (ReCap) database, which is commonly used for alliance research in the biotech-
nology industry (Schilling, 2009). Of the 231 firms, 196 had one or multiple alliances during the
sampling window.
We collected additional data to measure independent and control variables from the NBER Patent
Data Project, Compustat, the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) US Stock Databases, the
Pharmaprojects® data set of Informa Pharma Intelligence, Mergent Online, Mergent Archives, and
firms' 10-K filings and initial public offering (IPO) prospectuses. We applied listwise deletion in case
of missing data and retained all firms with at least 2 years of available data, reducing the sample from
196 to 165 DBFs, which resulted in a final panel data set of 1,016 firm–year observations involving
the formation of 1,340 alliances. This data set formed the basis for our empirical models predicting
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alliance portfolio reconfiguration in the years 1985–2000. The panel is unbalanced, reflecting a sub-
stantial increase in the number of alliances formed in pharmaceutical biotechnology during the sam-
pling period (Frankort & Hagedoorn, 2019). To address left-censoring, we used information on
alliance formation by the sampled firms during 1981–1984, from which we constructed initial alli-
ance portfolios. Subsequently, we constructed the variables related to firms' alliance portfolios based
on a rolling 4-year window. Our dependent variables take a 1-year lead in our analyses, meaning that
alliances formed from year t − 3 to year t (i.e., the firm's “existing alliance portfolio”) affected alli-
ance formations in year t + 1. This is consistent with the common assumption of a 5-year horizon of
alliances in biotechnology (Robinson & Stuart, 2007).
4.3 | Dependent variables
Consistent with our conceptualization of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, we used three dependent
variables according to the nature of the partners and resources involved in a firm's newly formed alli-
ances in a given year. We obtained information on partner identities and resources exchanged for
each alliance from ReCap. For each newly formed alliance, we established whether the alliance part-
ner was “novel,” in the sense that the firm had no active alliance(s) with that partner in its existing
alliance portfolio (Beckman et al., 2004; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006). Similarly, we established
whether a resource provided by a newly formed alliance was “new” to a firm's alliance portfolio, in
that it was not already provided by an alliance in the firm's existing portfolio. Following Asgari et al.
(2017, p. 1069), we identified and distinguished resources using ReCap's classification of alliances
as pertaining to one or multiple of 53 possible technological areas.2
We used this information to specify three distinct counts of alliances as our dependent variables.
First, novel partners − existing resources is the count of alliances formed by a firm in year t + 1
involving a novel partner and exclusively focusing on resources already accessible through the firm's
existing alliance portfolio. This is the dependent variable to test Hypotheses 1, 4a, and 5a. Second,
existing partners − new resources is the count of alliances formed by a firm in year t + 1 involving
at least one new resource, with a partner already in the firm's existing alliance portfolio. This was the
dependent variable to test Hypotheses 2, 4b, and 5b. Third, novel partners − new resources is the
count of alliances formed by a firm in year t + 1 involving a novel partner and at least one new
resource. This was the dependent variable to test Hypotheses 3, 4c, and 5c.
4.4 | Independent variables and moderators
4.4.1 | Performance relative to aspirations
We constructed our variables for performance relative to aspirations based on the difference between
a firm's performance in year t and its historical and social performance aspiration levels, respectively.
In many prior studies, performance has been based on accounting or financial measures. Yet, during
the emergence of the industry, “biotechnologies” were typically far removed from the product market
2We classified each alliance as focused on new or existing resources from a focal firm's point of view. Typically, such
resources include alliance partners' proprietary data or expertise in a specified technological area. Unlike Asgari et al. (2017),
who record separate alliances for each resource exchanged in a given collaboration, for each firm we recorded each alliance
only once, regardless of the number of resources exchanged. Instead, we considered an alliance to focus on new resources
when the alliance included at least one technological area that was not included in any alliance in the firm's alliance portfolio.
Similarly, we considered an alliance to focus on existing resources when the alliance did not include at least one technological
area that was not included in any alliance in the firm's portfolio.
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and audiences focused their attention on evidence of promising technologies (Pisano, 2006). Thus,
consistent with recent studies assessing performance feedback in technology-intensive industries
(Gaba & Bhattacharya, 2012; Lungeanu et al., 2016; Tyler & Caner, 2016), we focused on innova-
tion performance to construct our performance variables.
We relied on the patenting activities of the DBFs in our sample to calculate their innovation per-
formance, and to construct historical and social aspiration levels. Patents have the potential to protect
competitive advantage in biotechnology because they offer effective intellectual property protection
necessary for firms to bring new technologies to market (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 2000). Some
observers even note that “the biotechnology industry would not have emerged but for the existence
of predictable patents” (Federal Trade Commission, 2003, p. 17). Moreover, prior studies show that
biotechnology firms with more patents attract more financing and go to IPO faster (Baum &
Silverman, 2004; Stuart, Hoang, & Hybels, 1999), while they also achieve higher market valuations
once they are publicly traded (Hall, Jaffe, & Trajtenberg, 2005). Consistent with these observations,
numerous studies examining biotechnology have based measures of innovation performance on
counts of patents (e.g., Baum et al., 2000; Rothaermel & Hess, 2007; Whittington, Owen-Smith, &
Powell, 2009), and patents are used to construct measures of performance relative to aspirations in
recent studies analyzing technology-intensive settings like ours (Gaba & Bhattacharya, 2012;
Lungeanu et al., 2016).
We measured innovation performance as a firm's number of successful patent applications in year
t. Subsequently, we calculated measures of performance − aspirations by subtracting historical and
social aspiration levels, respectively, from the firm's actual innovation performance in a given year.
Following prior research (Greve, 2003b; Levinthal & March, 1981), we calculated historical aspira-
tion levels as exponentially weighted moving averages of historical performance, as follows:
Ait = αAit−1 + (1 − α)Pit−1, where i is a subscript for firms; t is a time subscript; P is the number of
successful patent applications in a given year; and the updating parameter α is the weight attached to
the most recent historical aspiration level Ait−1. Following Greve (2003b, p. 129), we defined α as
the value that provides the best fit of the models to the data (e.g., Bromiley & Harris, 2014; Gaba &
Bhattacharya, 2012; Lungeanu et al., 2016). In our case, models predicting novel partners − existing
resources retained an α of .1, while all other models retained an α of .9.
We obtained social aspiration levels based on the average patenting performance of other DBFs
in the panel in a given year (Lungeanu et al., 2016). Specifically, we calculated a firm's social aspira-
tion level as Sit =
P
j 6¼iPjt/(Nt − 1), where Pjt is the number of successful patent applications by a
DBF j other than focal firm i in year t, and Nt − 1 is the number of DBFs other than i in year t (Greve,
2003b). We used patent applications because DBFs have a reasonable sense of the average rate at
which patents are filed. Indeed, while not immediately made public by the United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO), information on pending patents is typically reported in the annual
reports of DBFs and likely moves extensively through networks of scientists, advisors, investors, and
analysts (Powell, 1996). Our measure of social aspirations restricts social comparison to other DBFs
because industry peers orient themselves towards the same (investor) audience and so constitute a
key reference group.
To summarize, performance − aspirations = Pit − Ait for historical aspirations, while it equals
Pit − Sit for social aspirations. We used spline specifications that are more flexible in allowing perfor-
mance − aspirations to have different slopes above and below the aspiration level (Greve, 2003b,
p. 125). Specifically, performance − aspirations (<0) equals performance − aspirations when per-
formance is below the aspiration level and equals 0 when performance is at or above the aspiration
level. Similarly, performance − aspirations (>0) equals performance − aspirations when
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performance is above the aspiration level and equals 0 when performance is at or below the aspira-
tion level. These variables help test Hypotheses 1, 2, 4a, 4b, 5a, and 5b.
4.4.2 | Absorbed slack
To test Hypothesis 3, we calculated absorbed slack as the ratio of a firm's selling, general, and
administrative expenses to its sales in year t, consistent with prior research (e.g., Greve, 2003a). To
test Hypotheses 4c and 5c, we interacted this variable with variables capturing equity ties and firm-
specific uncertainty, as defined next. We obtained similar results when operationalizing this variable
as the ratio of a firm's selling, general, and administrative expenses to its number of employees in a
given year.
4.4.3 | Equity ties
We constructed our first moderator, %equity alliances, as the share of all alliances in a firm's alliance
portfolio in year t that include minority equity investments and/or are joint ventures. To test Hypothe-
ses 4a–4c, we interacted this variable with the variables for performance relative to aspirations and
absorbed slack.
4.4.4 | Firm-specific uncertainty
We constructed our second moderator, firm-specific uncertainty, as the standardized monthly volatil-
ity of a firm's stock in year t, consistent with Beckman et al. (2004), Gulati et al. (2009), and Howard
et al. (2016). Specifically, for each firm in each year, we obtained the coefficient of variation by cal-
culating the standard deviation across the firm's monthly stock closing prices and dividing it by their
average. To test Hypotheses 5a–5c, we interacted this variable with the variables for performance rel-
ative to aspirations and absorbed slack.
4.5 | Control variables
All models included time fixed-effects to account for broader environmental changes affecting all
sampled firms such as fluctuations in the financing environment (e.g., Lerner, Shane, & Tsai, 2003),
or technological breakthroughs such as the advances in combinatorial chemistry and high throughput
screening in the 1990s (e.g., Asgari et al., 2017). Models predicting novel partners − existing
resources and novel partners − new resources included year fixed-effects. Models predicting existing
partners − new resources included fixed effects for 2-year periods because we used conditional
fixed-effects models that had less statistical power in these specific analyses. Nevertheless, various
unconditional estimators with year fixed-effects generated similar results (see section 4.6 below). We
also included a number of control variables at the firm level (for year t) and the alliance portfolio
level (for years t − 3 to t), which may affect alliance formation in year t + 1.
At the firm level, we controlled for two forms of financial slack which may affect a firm's alliance
formation (e.g., Patzelt, Shepherd, Deeds, & Bradley, 2008). Following prior research (e.g., Greve,
2003a), we measured unabsorbed slack as the ratio of a firm's cash and short-term investments to its
liabilities, and potential slack as the ratio of a firm's equity to debt. To account for potential changes
in the nature of innovation strategies due to organizational aging and experience (e.g., Rothaermel &
Boeker, 2008; Sørensen & Stuart, 2000), we controlled for age as a firm's age in years since
16 KAVUSAN AND FRANKORT
incorporation. We controlled for a firm's return on assets (ROA) to account for the role of financial
performance in affecting the attractiveness of the firm as an alliance partner (Beckman et al., 2004).
Headcount captures the natural logarithm of a firm's number of employees, which accounted for a
possible link between the size of a DBF and the scale and nature of its external relationships (Powell,
Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). We accounted for the scale of a DBF's involvement in drug discovery,
which may affect a firm's resource requirements (Asgari et al., 2017). Specifically, clinical trials is
the natural logarithm of the number of a firm's drugs that are in clinical trials.
We also included two variables for a DBF's capacity to handle external knowledge (Cohen &
Levinthal, 1990). R&D expenditures is the natural logarithm of a DBF's R&D expenditures, captur-
ing its R&D capacity. Technological scope is the extent to which the patents in a firm's patent stock
are distributed across distinct technology classes, which proxies for the scope of exploitable comple-
mentarities (Cassiman & Veugelers, 2002). Specifically, it captures (1 −
Pj
1p
2
j )*(Nit/(Nit − 1)),
where p is the proportion of a DBF's patents in patent class j and Nit is the DBF's total number of pat-
ents (Frankort, 2016).
At the alliance portfolio level, alliance portfolio size measures the number of alliances in a firm's
alliance portfolio, which may increase or decrease the probability of additional alliance formation
(Deeds & Hill, 1996; Powell et al., 1996). It comprises all alliances formed during the 4-year period
from t − 3 to t. The variable resources in portfolio captures the proportion of all 53 technologies
listed in the ReCap database covered in a DBF's existing alliance portfolio. The more resources
already covered, the less likely a firm would form alliances focusing on new resources. Two addi-
tional variables capture the characteristics of the alliances in a firm's existing alliance portfolio, which
may incentivize particular types of new alliance formation. Commercialization alliances is the share
of a firm's alliances that include a commercialization provision for the outcome of the alliance, while
R&D alliances is the share of a firm's alliances that explicitly designate R&D as a major activity in
the alliance.
4.6 | Estimation
Because the three dependent variables are nonnegative count variables, we estimated all models
using a Poisson quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) estimator with conditional firm fixed-effects
(Wooldridge, 1999). Firm fixed-effects impose a within-firm correlation structure on the data that
accounts for stable firm differences in alliance formation, which is important to obtain estimates of
alliance formation in response to performance feedback and slack resources that are not confounded
by more habitual, institutionalized drivers of alliance formation (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003b,
pp. 89–90). The Poisson QML estimator accommodates auto-correlated error terms and over-
dispersion and is robust to conditional heteroscedasticity.
A conditional fixed-effects specification discards firms without nonzero values on the dependent
variable but generates unbiased and consistent estimates. Therefore, depending on the specific depen-
dent variable, effective sample sizes vary across the models. To assess the consistency between con-
ditional and unconditional fixed-effects estimations, we separately estimated all models on the full
sample of 1,016 firm–years (165 firms) using both unconditional fixed-effects negative binomial
regression with robust standard errors (Allison & Waterman, 2002), and ordinary least squares
(OLS) fixed-effects regression in log-linear form, with standard errors corrected for autocorrelation
(Driscoll & Kraay, 1998). Both alternatives generated essentially identical results across the various
hypotheses tests, including models for existing partners − new resources that included year rather
than 2-year fixed-effects.
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5 | RESULTS
Table 3 shows descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations among all the variables. Correlations
are generally low to moderate among the explanatory variables (columns 4–23), although a few are
somewhat higher. Some of the variables for performance − aspirations (>0) are strongly correlated
but none of these are used in the same model. Moreover, alliance portfolio size and resources in
portfolio are correlated at r = .83. However, this correlation partly reflects differences between firms
(i.e., the portfolios of firms with more alliances on average cover more resources), which are
absorbed by firm fixed-effects. We examined the variance inflation factors (VIFs) for all explanatory
variables to identify possible collinearity problems. The VIFs for all key variables are well below the
commonly accepted threshold of 10, suggesting that our estimations are not materially affected by
multicollinearity.
5.1 | Hypotheses tests
Table 4 shows the models we used to test Hypotheses 1–3. Consistent with prior studies
(e.g., Chen & Miller, 2007; Lungeanu et al., 2016), we show separate models for performance rela-
tive to historical and social aspirations. In models 1 and 2, the coefficients for performance − aspira-
tions are negative, yet they are precisely estimated only above aspirations (t = −1.76 and t = −2.69
in models 1 and 2, respectively). Nevertheless, the estimates for below- and above-aspiration perfor-
mance are statistically indistinguishable (Chi2[1df] = 0.05, p = .83 in model 1; Chi2[1df] = 1.86,
p = .17 in model 2). Thus, the models could be re-estimated more parsimoniously without spline
(Greve, 2003a, p. 694). Once this is done, the coefficient for performance − aspirations is −0.0028
(t = −3.38; p = .001) in model 1 and −0.0044 (t = −3.19; p = .001) in model 2. These estimates
imply that, as performance decreases by one standard deviation relative to historical aspirations, the
firm's estimated rate of alliance formation with novel partners focusing on existing resources
increases by 4.4% (exp[−0.0028* − 15.51] = 1.044).3 As performance decreases by one standard
deviation relative to social aspirations, the firm's estimated rate of alliance formation with novel part-
ners focusing on existing resources increases by 8.3% (exp[−0.0043* − 18.45] = 1.083). These
results are consistent with Hypothesis 1: The lower a firm's performance relative to aspirations, the
greater the number of newly formed alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources.
In model 3, the coefficients for performance − aspirations are positive and precisely determined
above aspirations (t = 2.75). Nevertheless, the estimates for below- and above-aspiration perfor-
mance are statistically indistinguishable (Chi2[1df] = 0.60, p = .44). We thus re-estimated the model
without spline, resulting in a coefficient for performance − aspirations of 0.0170 (t = 2.75;
p = .006). Therefore, as performance increases by one standard deviation relative to historical aspira-
tions, the firm's estimated rate of alliance formation with existing partners focusing on new resources
increases by about 50% (exp[0.0176*23.19] = 1.504).
In model 4, the coefficients for performance − aspirations are positive and precisely determined
both below and above aspirations (t = 2.44 and t = 2.95, respectively), yet here the two slopes appear
statistically distinct (Chi2[1df] = 5.48, p = .02). Thus, below social aspirations, as performance
increases by one standard deviation, the firm's estimated rate of alliance formation with existing part-
ners focusing on new resources increases by almost 160% (exp[0.4220*2.25] = 2.584). And above
social aspirations, a one-standard deviation increase in performance instead increases this rate by
3We base these and subsequent calculations on descriptive statistics for each individual estimation sample, which varies across
the models due to conditional estimation.
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about 68% (exp[0.0219*23.64] = 1.678). Together with the results in model 3, these estimates are
consistent with Hypothesis 2: The higher a firm's performance relative to aspirations, the greater the
number of newly formed alliances with existing partners focusing on new resources.
Models 5 and 6 test Hypothesis 3, predicting that absorbed slack increases a firm's propensity to
form alliances with novel partners focusing on new resources. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the
coefficient for absorbed slack is positive and precisely determined in both models 5 and 6 (t = 2.53
and t = 2.60, respectively). The point estimates are similar between the two models. Based on model
5, a one-standard deviation increase in absorbed slack increases the estimated rate of alliance forma-
tion with novel partners focusing on new resources by 17.4% (exp[0.0067*23.94] = 1.174).
Table 5 shows models to test Hypotheses 4a–4c. Models 1 and 2 test Hypothesis 4a, by inter-
acting performance − aspirations with %equity alliances. Although the estimates are indistinguish-
able from zero in model 2, in model 1 the coefficient for this interaction term is positive below
aspirations and clearly inconsistent with a null effect (t = 3.49, p = .000). The interaction coefficient
is negative and somewhat less precisely determined above aspirations (t = −1.76, p = .078). To
understand these findings, Figure 1 uses the point estimates in model 1 of Table 5 to show the esti-
mated interaction effect at the 10th, 50th, and 90th percentiles of %equity alliances. Below the histor-
ical aspiration level, a decrease in performance − aspirations more strongly stimulates the formation
of alliances with novel partners focusing on existing resources when the firm has a smaller propor-
tion of equity ties to existing partners. Interestingly, above the historical aspiration level, an increase
in performance − aspirations more strongly reduces the formation of alliances with novel partners
focusing on existing resources when the firm shares more equity ties with existing partners. Together,
these findings partially support Hypothesis 4a.
Models 3–6 test Hypotheses 4b and 4c.4 In these models, all the interaction coefficients have rela-
tively large standard errors and t-statistics consistently below unity, rendering all coefficients indis-
tinguishable from zero at acceptable confidence levels. Thus, our data do not support
Hypotheses 4b–4c.
Table 6 shows models to test Hypotheses 5a–5c. Models 1 and 2 test Hypothesis 5a, by inter-
acting performance − aspirations with firm-specific uncertainty. Although again the estimates are
indistinguishable from zero in the social aspiration model (model 2), in model 1 the interaction coef-
ficient is positive below aspirations and inconsistent with a null effect (t = −2.51, p = .012). Above
aspirations, the interaction coefficient is indistinguishable from zero (t = 0.74, p = .458). Figure 2
uses the point estimates in model 1 of Table 6 to show the estimated interaction effect at the 10th,
50th, and 90th percentiles of firm-specific uncertainty. Below historical aspirations, a decrease in per-
formance more strongly stimulates the formation of alliances with novel partners focusing on exis-
ting resources when firm-specific uncertainty is greater. These findings partially support
Hypothesis 5a.
Models 3–6 test Hypotheses 5b and 5c. In these models, all the interaction coefficients have large
standard errors and t-statistics well below unity, again rendering all coefficients indistinguishable
from zero at acceptable confidence levels. Thus, our data do not support Hypotheses 5b and 5c.
Overall, the empirical evidence in Tables 5 and 6 is inconclusive with respect to whether or not the
mechanisms underlying Hypotheses 4b, 4c, 5b, and 5c are operative. In the absence of such evi-
dence, we suggest that perhaps equity ties and firm-specific uncertainty represent more critical con-
tingencies when a firm is engaged in problemistic search.
4Due to collinearity, we could not estimate spline interactions in model 3. Instead, we estimated one interaction term for
continuous performance–aspirations by %equity alliances.We did the same in Table 6, when assessing the moderating effects
of firm-specific uncertainty.
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To summarize, after controlling for a range of time-varying factors at the firm and alliance portfo-
lio levels, and fixed effects for firms and time, we found that the nature of alliance portfolio
reconfiguration is affected by performance relative to aspirations and organizational slack. Firms
expand the partner base, but not the resource base, of their alliance portfolios as performance
decreases relative to aspirations (Hypothesis 1), albeit at a reduced rate when they share equity ties
with existing partners (Hypothesis 4a), and at an increased rate when they experience firm-specific
uncertainty (Hypothesis 5a). Firms instead expand the resource base of their alliance portfolios, but
not the partner base, as performance increases relative to aspirations (Hypothesis 2). Finally, simulta-
neous expansion of partner and resource bases occurs as organizational slack increases
(Hypothesis 3).5
5.2 | Robustness
We assessed the sensitivity of our findings through several additional tests. First, our focus on firm-
specific uncertainty as measured by stock data required that all sample firms were public, although
our theory imposed no such requirement. We thus enlarged our sample to incorporate firm–year
observations in which the DBFs were still private entities. This way, our estimation sample grew
from 165 DBFs and 1,016 firm–year observations to 187 DBFs and 1,099 firm–year observations.
While we were unable to test Hypotheses 5a–5c because firm-specific uncertainty was only
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FIGURE 1 Rate multiplier for novel partners − existing resources (Hypothesis 4a)
5It is important to note that the heterogeneity in the effects of different behavioral drivers constitutes a conservative finding
because all our empirical specifications allow for the possibility that below-aspiration performance, above-aspiration
performance, and organizational slack have entirely identical consequences.
KAVUSAN AND FRANKORT 25
T
A
B
L
E
6
Po
is
so
n
qu
as
i-
m
ax
im
um
lik
el
ih
oo
d
(Q
M
L
)
co
nd
iti
on
al
fi
xe
d-
ef
fe
ct
s
es
tim
at
es
:H
yp
ot
he
se
s
5a
–5
c
D
ep
en
de
nt
va
ri
ab
le
N
ov
el
pa
rt
ne
rs
−
ex
is
tin
g
re
so
ur
ce
s
E
xi
st
in
g
pa
rt
ne
rs
−
ne
w
re
so
ur
ce
s
N
ov
el
pa
rt
ne
rs
−
ne
w
re
so
ur
ce
s
A
sp
ir
at
io
n
le
ve
l
H
is
to
ri
ca
l
So
ci
al
H
is
to
ri
ca
l
So
ci
al
H
is
to
ri
ca
l
So
ci
al
(1
)
(2
)
(3
)
(4
)
(5
)
(6
)
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
−
as
pi
ra
tio
ns
(<
0)
0.
00
12
[0
.0
01
7]
−
0.
06
82
[0
.0
52
0]
2.
20
40
[2
.8
22
6]
0.
52
53
[0
.4
21
9]
0.
01
11
[0
.2
04
9]
0.
01
14
[0
.0
33
3]
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
−
as
pi
ra
tio
ns
(>
0)
−
0.
00
58
[0
.0
03
1]
−
0.
00
47
[0
.0
02
0]
0.
00
76
[0
.0
17
5]
0.
01
38
[0
.0
28
9]
0.
00
42
[0
.0
03
2]
0.
00
57
[0
.0
03
6]
A
bs
or
be
d
sl
ac
k
−
0.
00
32
[0
.0
03
0]
−
0.
00
15
[0
.0
02
9]
0.
06
31
[0
.0
27
2]
0.
05
39
[0
.0
22
9]
0.
01
04
[0
.0
05
2]
0.
00
85
[0
.0
05
1]
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
−
as
pi
ra
tio
ns
(<
0)
*f
ir
m
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
−
0.
00
86
[0
.0
03
3]
0.
05
75
[0
.0
97
0]
−
0.
45
37
[1
.2
32
3]
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
−
as
pi
ra
tio
ns
(>
0)
*f
ir
m
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
0.
01
32
[0
.0
16
6]
0.
00
50
[0
.0
09
3]
0.
03
09
[0
.1
14
4]
Pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
−
as
pi
ra
tio
ns
*f
ir
m
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
0.
03
45
[0
.0
74
0]
A
bs
or
be
d
sl
ac
k*
fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
−
0.
00
96
[0
.0
12
9]
−
0.
00
66
[0
.0
12
5]
%
eq
ui
ty
al
lia
nc
es
−
0.
31
87
[0
.4
09
4]
−
0.
38
01
[0
.3
61
5]
−
1.
05
86
[1
.3
37
9]
−
1.
39
44
[1
.4
07
9]
0.
11
49
[0
.4
39
4]
0.
30
31
[0
.3
94
8]
Fi
rm
-s
pe
ci
fi
c
un
ce
rt
ai
nt
y
0.
34
31
[0
.3
37
7]
0.
81
52
[0
.4
01
2]
−
7.
61
00
[4
.1
97
1]
−
8.
21
34
[5
.7
69
4]
0.
31
88
[0
.3
71
2]
0.
16
63
[0
.3
93
1]
U
na
bs
or
be
d
sl
ac
k
−
0.
01
45
[0
.0
12
3]
−
0.
02
28
[0
.0
11
5]
−
0.
26
89
[0
.1
92
6]
−
0.
24
91
[0
.1
27
9]
−
0.
02
92
[0
.0
14
7]
−
0.
02
03
[0
.0
13
2]
Po
te
nt
ia
ls
la
ck
−
0.
00
01
[0
.0
00
1]
−
0.
00
01
[0
.0
00
1]
0.
00
04
[0
.0
00
6]
0.
00
03
[0
.0
00
6]
−
0.
00
00
[0
.0
00
1]
−
0.
00
00
[0
.0
00
1]
A
ge
0.
78
16
[0
.5
65
4]
−
0.
21
13
[0
.3
80
9]
0.
58
13
[0
.4
63
5]
0.
86
92
[0
.3
98
5]
−
0.
01
27
[0
.5
20
3]
0.
36
86
[0
.3
39
7]
R
et
ur
n
on
as
se
ts
−
0.
34
34
[0
.1
38
0]
−
0.
26
03
[0
.1
38
0]
4.
72
31
[2
.5
12
5]
2.
70
73
[1
.9
61
6]
−
0.
29
69
[0
.2
44
5]
−
0.
38
03
[0
.2
27
8]
H
ea
dc
ou
nt
(l
og
)
0.
01
26
[0
.1
66
2]
0.
12
30
[0
.1
48
1]
−
1.
83
91
[1
.1
73
5]
−
1.
91
56
[0
.9
36
6]
−
0.
04
79
[0
.2
09
5]
−
0.
05
12
[0
.1
89
0]
C
lin
ic
al
tr
ia
ls
(l
og
)
0.
01
40
[0
.1
66
2]
0.
01
26
[0
.1
66
1]
0.
00
59
[1
.0
84
1]
0.
47
42
[1
.3
18
4]
−
0.
00
72
[0
.1
58
9]
−
0.
01
22
[0
.1
47
5]
R
&
D
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
s
(l
og
)
0.
11
29
[0
.1
25
9]
0.
12
43
[0
.1
15
9]
1.
33
95
[0
.7
36
3]
1.
34
02
[0
.6
44
4]
0.
20
78
[0
.1
94
9]
0.
18
79
[0
.1
82
7]
T
ec
hn
ol
og
ic
al
sc
op
e
0.
15
21
[0
.3
64
1]
0.
38
37
[0
.3
10
5]
1.
19
46
[3
.1
05
8]
1.
42
85
[2
.9
84
0]
0.
82
17
[0
.6
68
2]
0.
31
42
[0
.4
63
6]
A
lli
an
ce
po
rt
fo
lio
si
ze
−
0.
01
88
[0
.0
12
0]
−
0.
01
98
[0
.0
11
2]
0.
13
53
[0
.0
94
0]
0.
16
28
[0
.0
92
0]
−
0.
02
24
[0
.0
31
0]
−
0.
02
80
[0
.0
30
1]
R
es
ou
rc
es
in
po
rt
fo
lio
4.
43
20
[1
.1
70
2]
4.
63
41
[1
.1
23
5]
−
10
.5
44
8
[6
.5
96
1]
−
15
.7
47
1
[7
.8
84
4]
−
3.
58
87
[2
.8
83
4]
−
3.
37
51
[2
.6
86
0]
C
om
m
er
ci
al
iz
at
io
n
al
lia
nc
es
−
0.
67
02
[0
.4
91
0]
−
0.
69
27
[0
.4
40
9]
−
3.
06
86
[2
.8
09
0]
−
1.
04
15
[2
.5
05
8]
−
0.
06
94
[0
.5
06
7]
−
0.
13
76
[0
.4
74
0]
R
&
D
al
lia
nc
es
0.
67
67
[0
.3
87
9]
0.
78
16
[0
.3
33
9]
0.
32
47
[1
.3
84
1]
1.
59
28
[1
.6
66
4]
−
0.
49
07
[0
.3
21
1]
−
0.
40
74
[0
.2
91
1]
n
(f
ir
m
–y
ea
rs
)
67
5
73
9
16
2
17
1
77
8
86
9
n
(f
ir
m
s)
10
3
10
5
20
20
11
8
12
4
L
og
-l
ik
el
ih
oo
d
−
54
6.
7
−
59
1.
7
−
29
.7
7
−
29
.2
6
−
55
1.
9
−
63
5.
6
N
ot
e:
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
in
br
ac
ke
ts
.A
ll
m
od
el
s
in
cl
ud
e
tim
e
fi
xe
d
ef
fe
ct
s.
26 KAVUSAN AND FRANKORT
identifiable for public DBFs, we found results for Hypotheses 1–3 and 4a–4c that were essentially
identical to those shown in Tables 4 and 5.6
Second, our results remained similar once we excluded from the estimation sample one DBF
offering contract research services, and five DBFs headquartered outside the United States, all in
Europe.7 These restrictions gave even greater comparability in the line of business and normal
resource requirements of the sampled firms, enhancing the validity of the performance feedback and
slack resource effects (Greve, 2003a, 2003b).
Third, in models predicting novel partners − new resources, we excluded firm–year observations
corresponding to years in which firms formed their first alliance(s) (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006,
p. 808). By disregarding novice collaborators, this criterion restricts novel partners − new resources
to only those alliances formed by firms already managing an active alliance portfolio, allowing us to
interpret all instances of alliance formation in the restricted sample as genuine acts of alliance portfo-
lio reconfiguration. Alternatively, we included in the full sample a dummy variable capturing
whether or not a firm's alliance portfolio had a size of zero in a given year. Across both approaches,
we found results fully consistent with those shown in models 5 and 6 in Tables 4–6, although the
coefficient for absorbed slack was larger (roughly 0.011) and more precisely determined (t > 3) in
the restricted sample.
Fourth, we examined the possibility that our performance − aspirations measures absorb a cate-
gorical rather than continuous classification, where performance below aspirations is considered a
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FIGURE 2 Rate multiplier for novel partners − existing resources (Hypothesis 5a)
6In all models, we included a fixed effect for whether an observation concerned a private firm. We found that, all else constant,
private firms were less likely than public firms to expand either the partner or the resource base of their alliance portfolios.
7Embrex Inc. was excluded from the sample because it offered contract research services, and the excluded European DBFs
were Alkermes PLC (Ireland), Flamel Technologies SA and Genset SA (France), Qiagen NV (Netherlands), and Xenova
Group PLC (UK).
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failure, and above aspirations a success, regardless of how far performance is away from the aspira-
tion level (Greve, 2003b, pp. 59–61). We checked for this possibility by incorporating dummy vari-
ables for whether or not performance was below aspirations (Baum et al., 2005, p. 551). The results
for the direct and interactive effects of performance − aspirations were identical. Thus, the sign and
magnitude of performance relative to aspirations, rather than its sign alone, affect the nature of alli-
ance portfolio reconfiguration.
Finally, rather than estimating separate models for the three dependent variables, we also esti-
mated least-squares simultaneous equations models, each in log-linear form, that jointly predict the
three outcomes for all sampled firm–years. This approach explicitly treats the three alliance
portfolio-reconfiguration decisions as interrelated and simultaneously determined (Zellner, 1962).
For both performance relative to historical and social aspirations, we estimated one system of equa-
tions to jointly test Hypotheses 1–3; one to jointly test Hypotheses 4a–4c; and one to jointly test
Hypotheses 5a–5c. Across the six systems of simultaneous equations, we found evidence strongly
consistent with that in Tables 4–6, while some of the coefficients testing Hypotheses 4b and 5b were
more precisely determined. However, such precision must be treated cautiously because multiple
testing (e.g., more than a dozen tests across alternative specifications alone) progressively increases
the probability of false positives (Romano, Shaikh, & Wolf, 2010).
6 | DISCUSSION
While the consequences of alliance portfolio configurations have received considerable scholarly
attention, less is known about how and why firms reconfigure their alliance portfolios over time. In
this study, we complement the literature on alliance portfolio reconfiguration by developing and test-
ing a comprehensive behavioral perspective. We found that as performance decreases relative to aspi-
rations, firms form alliances with novel partners within the resource scope of their existing alliance
portfolios. Such problemistic search is attenuated by equity ties with existing partners but intensified
by firm-specific uncertainty. Conversely, as performance increases relative to aspirations, firms form
alliances with existing partners but outside the resource scope of their existing alliance portfolios.
Finally, firms accumulating organizational slack most radically reconfigure their alliance portfolios
by forming alliances with novel partners focusing on new-to-the-portfolio resources.
This study's primary contribution is to research examining the antecedents of alliance portfolio
reconfiguration. Available studies point at external contingencies, such as gradual or discontinuous
technological changes (Asgari et al., 2017; Lavie & Singh, 2012) and market competition and uncer-
tainty (Beckman et al., 2004; Ozcan, 2018), as drivers of alliance portfolio reconfiguration. Internal
contingencies, such as firm-specific uncertainty, competencies, and business strategy, have also been
identified as important because they can mediate the ways in which external contingencies influence
portfolio reconfiguration (Beckman et al., 2004; Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie & Singh, 2012). We contrib-
ute to this emerging body of research by explicitly considering how alliance portfolio-reconfiguration
decisions may also derive from behavioral heuristics as a consequence of managers' bounded ratio-
nality (Cyert & March, 1963). While firms may proactively or reactively engage in alliance portfolio
reconfigurations through a rational evaluation of external and/or internal contingencies, we argue and
show that reconfiguration decisions are also shaped in predictable ways by performance feedback
and organizational slack, thus making portfolio reconfiguration responsive to behavioral antecedents.
One implication of this evidence is that behavioral drivers can help explain why firms may devi-
ate from longer-term portfolio strategies (e.g., Hoffmann, 2007), which may lead their portfolios to
look like apparently incoherent sets of individual alliances. Awareness of the fact that behavioral
28 KAVUSAN AND FRANKORT
factors may drive portfolio reconfiguration may assist managers and investors when interpreting and
responding to the portfolio-reconfiguration choices of their (potential) partners, competitors, and/or
investees. Indeed, an act of alliance portfolio reconfiguration might require different responses
depending on whether such changes are driven by fundamental shifts in business strategy, external
contingencies, or behavioral factors.
Our behavioral theory extends research on alliance portfolio reconfiguration also by proposing
that behavioral drivers lead firms to form alliances in an attempt to alter the synergies and conflicts
arising from their portfolios' partner and resource characteristics. Thus, it incorporates the multi-
dimensionality of alliance portfolio (re)configuration (Wassmer, 2010), by underlining the need to
simultaneously consider partner choice and resource focus in firms' newly formed alliances. While of
course practitioners are faced with multiple concurrent considerations when forming alliances to rec-
onfigure their portfolios, available theory and evidence have mostly focused on individual consider-
ations of partner choice (Beckman et al., 2004; Howard et al., 2016) or the nature of accessed
resources (Asgari et al., 2017). Our theory clarifies how a concurrent focus on partner-choice and
resource-focus decisions is a necessary consequence of the value creation and appropriation prefer-
ences formed by firms with respect to their alliance portfolios in response to behavioral antecedents.
By drawing attention to the importance of concurrent partner-choice and resource-focus decisions,
our theory also contributes to behavioral theory. Studies in the behavioral tradition have typically
examined how performance feedback and organizational slack affect the intensity of search along
one dimension. For example, evidence shows higher R&D intensities in firms performing below
aspirations, but also in firms with higher levels of slack (Chen & Miller, 2007; Greve, 2003a). And
Baum et al. (2005) find that Canadian investment banks facing attainment discrepancies, whether
negative or positive, are more likely to accept the risk and uncertainty of underwriting syndicate ties
with partners with which they have no existing direct or third-party ties. Our study departs from and
extends such evidence by uncovering meaningful heterogeneity in the consequences of different
behavioral drivers: Not only do positive and negative attainment discrepancies predict distinct types
of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, but also slack predicts a reconfiguration type not predicted by
performance above or below aspirations. Thus, we show how behavioral drivers determine not only
the intensity of search in an individual dimension of an organizational activity, but also heterogeneity
in the distribution of search across multiple dimensions of that same activity.
These findings underscore the importance, for behavioral research, of more rigorously examining
the nature of distinct search processes. Behavioral theory has long typified the nature of problemistic
search as more short-term, myopic, and somewhat exploitative, but that of slack search as relatively
exploratory. Yet, by focusing on the intensity of search along one dimension, empirical studies have
not explored the possible implications of this fundamental conceptual distinction (an exception is
Xu, Zhou, & Du, 2018), nor have they examined possible differences in the nature of slack search
derived from positive attainment discrepancies versus organizational slack. Thus, it has proven diffi-
cult to disentangle the various search processes responsible for observed search intensities (Posen
et al., 2018). By predicting and uncovering how the nature of search differs with its origin in below-
aspiration performance, above-aspiration performance, or organizational slack, our study extends the
behavioral literature with more fine-grained and discerning evidence of behaviorally motivated orga-
nizational search.
A final set of contributions emerge from elucidating how actor-specific contingencies interacted
with the behavioral mechanisms shaping alliance portfolio reconfiguration. By uncovering how a
firm's equity ties and firm-specific uncertainty moderated the intensity of problemistic search in
response to performance feedback, we extend a nascent understanding in the behavioral theory of the
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factors that explain heterogeneity in firms' responsiveness to performance feedback (Greve & Gaba,
2017; Shinkle, 2012). First, we found that firms performing below aspirations are progressively more
likely to form alliances with novel partners in existing resources, yet equity ties to existing partners
reduced this tendency. Thus, consistent with Williamson's (1991) intuition that cooperative and
autonomous adaptation potential are inversely related, the possible advantages of equity-based com-
mitments, such as incentive alignment with existing partners (Oxley, 1997), may come at the cost of
limiting a firm's ability to bring conflicting partners into its alliance portfolio. By implication, firms
must consider whether the anticipated benefits of equity in a focal alliance outweigh the reduced abil-
ity to adapt the broader portfolio beyond that alliance. Second, we found that below aspirations,
firm-specific uncertainty intensifies the formation of alliances with novel partners in existing
resources. This finding extends evidence that firm-specific uncertainty motivates alliance formation
(Beckman et al., 2004) because it reveals that, by intensifying firms' responses to negative attainment
discrepancies, such uncertainty also interacts with the process of problemistic search.
7 | LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
Opportunities exist to extend our research and address some of its limitations. First, whether or not
particular alliance portfolio reconfiguration decisions will achieve their intended outcomes is inher-
ently uncertain, and firms' greatest control over portfolio synergies and conflicts is through decisions
that influence the potential for desired interdependencies. These are the decisions we considered.
Nevertheless, questions remain regarding the eventual effectiveness of alliance portfolio
reconfiguration decisions. Future research can complement our work by directly capturing portfolio
synergies and conflicts, and by exploring how firms can influence such interdependencies towards
realizing their value creation and appropriation preferences.
Second, firms reconfigure alliance portfolios through alliance formations and terminations
(e.g., Asgari et al., 2017; Ozcan, 2018). We have focused on alliance formations, although we
accounted for terminations by assuming a 5-year lifespan for each alliance, consistent with relevant
prior literature (e.g., Robinson & Stuart, 2007). Future studies might extend our behavioral perspec-
tive on alliance portfolio reconfiguration by focusing on alliance terminations. We believe such
efforts are worthwhile yet challenging: They require data on alliance termination dates and, crucially,
a sharp distinction between termination due to project or contract completion on the one hand, and
premature termination on the other (e.g., Greve, Baum, Mitsuhashi, & Rowley, 2010).
Third, DBFs are often limited in scope, yet interesting questions emerge regarding the role of hor-
izontal and vertical diversification in shaping links between behavioral drivers and alliance portfolio
reconfiguration. We examined the role of behavioral antecedents in shaping firms' alliance portfolio
configurations, yet in firms with larger scale and scope such antecedents might simultaneously influ-
ence multiple organizational activities, including acquisitions, divestitures, and venture capital invest-
ments. We believe that an extension such as this is valuable yet scholars must take care to consider
contextually important resources and performance outcomes when examining predictions in other
empirical settings. For example, we focused our empirics on technological resources because these
permeate all the activities of DBFs, including their alliances, regardless of whether they are alliances
with other DBFs, public sector research institutions, or pharmaceutical firms (Powell et al., 1996). In
settings where other resources are (also) a prevalent component of firms' external relationships, the
empirical analysis must reflect such resources. Relatedly, we based measures of performance relative
to aspirations on innovation performance, an outcome that DBFs' alliance portfolios are expected to
generate (e.g., Baum et al., 2000), and so one that should direct firms' search efforts to their alliance
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portfolios. Tests of the implications of our theory in other settings similarly require the identification
of contextually important performance outcomes.
8 | CONCLUSION
Our study introduces a comprehensive behavioral perspective to research on alliance portfolio
reconfiguration, which to date has mostly assumed value-maximizing managers while frequently
focusing on external antecedents. Assuming that managers are boundedly rational and reliant on
behavioral heuristics, we have focused on the internal factors of performance feedback and organiza-
tional slack as drivers of alliance portfolio reconfiguration, and we have offered evidence of some
contingencies affecting the behavioral mechanisms. We hope our theory and analyses will stimulate
further research on the evolution of portfolios of corporate development activities, and on the nature
and contingencies of distinct behaviorally driven search processes.
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